Only the latest release receives fixes. If you are on an older tag, update first. See Reporting a vulnerability below.

install_linux.sh runs with your Termux user's privileges, installs packages, writes launchers into $PREFIX/bin, and creates a sudo-like shim inside the guest. It does not require root on the device and never uses su.

Known, deliberate design limits. Read these before reporting them:

1. sudo cannot elevate. Android's NO_NEW_PRIVS makes setuid binaries useless inside proot, so the shim only performs the password ritual. It is not a privilege boundary and must not be treated as one.
2. Everyone inside the guest is the same UID. proot maps all guest users onto the Termux app UID. File ownership inside the guest is cosmetic.
3. The guest is not a sandbox. Anything running in the guest can read the Termux home directory that is bind-mounted into it.

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.

• Open a private report: https://github.com/pdev-labs/Linux-For-Android/security/advisories/new
• Include the affected version (./install_linux.sh --version), Android version, distro and desktop, and the smallest reproduction you can manage.

You can expect an initial reply within 7 days. If the issue is confirmed, a fix ships in the next release and the advisory is published with credit unless you ask to stay anonymous.

In scope:

• command injection or path traversal through installer inputs (distro name, instance name, hostname, username, timezone)
• secret leakage: install passwords, the VNC password, or the sudo shim secret ending up readable outside the intended mode-0600 file
• trusting a downloaded artifact from a host that should not be trusted
• anything that runs code as the Termux user without the user asking

Out of scope:

• the documented proot limitations above
• attacks that already require code execution inside the guest
• vulnerabilities in upstream packages, Termux, or the distros themselves

• Install-time secrets are written to a mode-0600 file that is deleted after use and on interrupt (trap).
• The sudo shim stores a salted SHA-256 hash, never the password, and is mode 0700.
• The Microsoft package-signing key is verified by fingerprint before the VS Code repository is added.
• Scraped download URLs are restricted to the vendor's own hosts.
• :latest container images can be pinned with LFA_IMAGE_<DISTRO>.