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[SECUR-236] fix: grouped-paginator cursor bound + Project mass-assignment - #9486
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…imiting AppScan DAST remediation, ported from the plane-ee fix (#8591) and re-verified against a live plane-ce instance. - paginator: reject non-positive per_page (per_page=0 -> ZeroDivisionError -> HTTP 500) and bound the client-supplied cursor value/offset. The grouped paginators use cursor.value as the per-group page size: a negative value slices the queryset with a negative stop (ValueError -> HTTP 500) and a huge value fetches far more than max_per_page rows per group (cap bypass / DoS). One central guard in BasePaginator.paginate(); regression tests added. - auth: sign-in/sign-up (app + space) were plain Views with no rate limiting. Add the IP-based AuthenticationThrottle check plus a per-account throttle keyed on the normalized email (AuthenticationAccountThrottle). The IP key is bypassable by spoofing X-Forwarded-For (NUM_PROXIES unset); the per-account limiter caps credential guessing against a single account regardless of IP. - project serializer: mark created_by/updated_by read-only (fields="__all__" left them client-writable, allowing project ownership/attribution forgery). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py (1)
52-76: 📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick winNo test coverage for the new account throttle.
This PR adds 17 paginator unit tests but nothing exercises
AuthenticationAccountThrottle.get_cache_key(email vs. no-email fallback, normalization) orauthentication_account_throttle_allows. Given this is security-critical brute-force protection, a few focused unit tests (cache-key bucketing by normalized email, fallback to IP when email absent, allow/deny across the rate window) would be valuable.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py` around lines 52 - 76, Add focused unit tests for AuthenticationAccountThrottle.get_cache_key covering normalized email bucketing, distinct emails, and IP fallback when email is absent; also test authentication_account_throttle_allows across the configured rate window to verify initial requests are allowed and excess requests are denied.apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py (1)
33-48: 📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick winExtract the duplicated throttle-check-and-redirect block into a shared helper. The same 16-line pattern (call
authentication_throttle_allows+authentication_account_throttle_allows, build aRATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDEDAuthenticationException, and safe-redirect) is copy-pasted across all four sign-in/sign-up handlers. A single helper (e.g. inrate_limit.py, parameterized byis_app/is_space) would remove the duplication and prevent future drift in this security-critical gating logic.
apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py#L33-L48: replace with a call to a sharedauthentication_rate_limit_redirect(request, next_path, is_app=True)helper that returnsNoneor the redirect.apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py#L158-L172: same replacement,is_app=True.apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py#L32-L47: same replacement,is_space=True.apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py#L133-L147: same replacement,is_space=True.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py` around lines 33 - 48, Extract the duplicated authentication throttle check and RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED redirect into a shared authentication_rate_limit_redirect helper, parameterized for app or space redirects and returning None when allowed. In apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py lines 33-48 and 158-172, replace each block with the helper using is_app=True; in apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py lines 32-47 and 133-147, replace each with is_space=True.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py`:
- Around line 52-69: Update AuthenticationAccountThrottle.get_cache_key so an
attacker cannot exhaust a victim’s throttle bucket solely by submitting the
victim’s email; derive the key from server-validated identity when available, or
combine the normalized email with the client identity. Preserve email
normalization and the existing IP fallback for requests without an email.
- Around line 63-64: Validate AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT before assigning
or using it in the authentication account throttle, ensuring it contains exactly
a numeric request count and a supported period in the expected “count/period”
format. Fall back to the existing default rate when the environment value is
empty or malformed, so AuthenticationAccountThrottle initialization remains safe
for every auth request.
---
Nitpick comments:
In `@apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py`:
- Around line 52-76: Add focused unit tests for
AuthenticationAccountThrottle.get_cache_key covering normalized email bucketing,
distinct emails, and IP fallback when email is absent; also test
authentication_account_throttle_allows across the configured rate window to
verify initial requests are allowed and excess requests are denied.
In `@apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py`:
- Around line 33-48: Extract the duplicated authentication throttle check and
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED redirect into a shared authentication_rate_limit_redirect
helper, parameterized for app or space redirects and returning None when
allowed. In apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py lines 33-48 and
158-172, replace each block with the helper using is_app=True; in
apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py lines 32-47 and 133-147,
replace each with is_space=True.
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apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.pyapps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.pyapps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.pyapps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.pyapps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.pyapps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
…+ rate guard - AuthenticationAccountThrottle keyed on (email + client IP) instead of email alone. An email-only key let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by spamming their address from other IPs (self-inflicted lockout DoS). Combining with the client IP prevents that while still capping single-source guessing. - Guard the AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT env value: a malformed rate would raise in DRF parse_rate() on every auth POST (throttle is instantiated per request), taking authentication down instance-wide. Falls back to the default. - Add regression tests for both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thanks @coderabbitai — both valid, fixed in 3257ee9:
Added regression tests for both ( |
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…9429 / #9335 Two parts of this PR fully overlapped existing open PRs against preview, so per the "drop the most recent on full overlap" call they are removed here: - per_page non-positive guard (get_per_page) -> covered identically by #9429. - password sign-in/sign-up rate limiting -> covered (more cleanly, via a decorator) by #9335 (GHSA-349j-pjw5-67q4). Reverted rate_limit.py and email.py (app + space) and removed the auth unit tests. This PR now carries only its unique, non-overlapping fixes: - grouped-paginator cursor bound in paginate() (cap-bypass DoS + negative-slice 500 that #9429 does not address), with TestCursorBounds. - Project created_by/updated_by read-only (mass-assignment). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pull request overview
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated no new comments.
Suppressed comments (2)
apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py:692
- The new cursor bound allows cursor.value == 0. In GroupedOffsetPaginator.get_result(), offset is computed as cursor.offset * cursor.value, so a 0 value makes every page (offset>0) map back to offset=0 and repeats the first page. Consider requiring cursor.value to be a positive integer (and normalizing/rejecting float values) before allowing it to drive grouped pagination.
effective_max_per_page = max(max_per_page, default_per_page)
if not (0 <= input_cursor.value <= effective_max_per_page) or input_cursor.offset < 0:
raise ParseError(detail="Invalid cursor parameter.")
apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py:143
- The cursor-bound regression test doesn't cover cursor values of 0. Since grouped pagination uses cursor.value in offset calculation, add a case like "0:1:0" (or "0:0:0") to ensure the guard rejects zero values and prevents repeated first-page results.
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cursor", ["-1:0:0", "1000000:0:0", "20:-1:0"])
…ssignment gaps Code review on this PR found its own vulnerability classes left open on adjacent code it didn't touch: - get_per_page() bounded per_page against max_per_page but never rejected a negative value, so it still reached OffsetPaginator.get_result() and produced a negative slice bound -- the same unhandled Django negative-index crash (HTTP 500) the cursor-bound fix in this PR closes, just via a different input. Reject negative per_page the same way an over-large one is already rejected, and dedupe the now-twice-computed effective max_per_page. - ProjectSerializer was fixed to mark created_by/updated_by read-only so a client can't forge attribution via PATCH (BaseModel.save() never re-stamps created_by on update). IssueViewSerializer and CycleWriteSerializer had the identical gap and are fixed the same way. - Corrected the ProjectSerializer comment: save() stamps created_by unconditionally on create, not just when it was previously None -- the real gap is that update() never touches it at all. Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
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Follow-up commit (33977a3) closes three gaps in the same vulnerability classes this PR already fixes elsewhere, found on adjacent code the original diff didn't touch: 1. Negative 2 & 3. Also corrected the Tests ( Separately, not touched: |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py`:
- Around line 655-660: Update the per_page validation in the paginator helper to
reject zero as well as negative values before returning, preventing
OffsetPaginator.get_result() from receiving a zero limit; preserve the existing
maximum-value validation and ParseError behavior.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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apps/api/plane/app/serializers/cycle.pyapps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.pyapps/api/plane/app/serializers/view.pyapps/api/plane/tests/unit/serializers/test_mass_assignment.pyapps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.pyapps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
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The negative-per_page guard added earlier in this PR let per_page=0 through unchanged. A zero value still reaches OffsetPaginator.get_result(), where math.ceil(count / limit) divides by the limit and raises an unhandled ZeroDivisionError (HTTP 500) — the same unhandled-crash class this PR closes for negative values, just with a different trigger. Tighten the guard to per_page <= 0 and correct the regression test that previously asserted 0 was accepted. Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
…is https (#10052) * [INFRA-1152] fix(security): mark session cookies Secure when WEB_URL is https Session, admin-session and CSRF cookies are now Secure when WEB_URL is https, not only when every CORS origin is https. Plain-http installs are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1152] fix(security): address review Fall back to APP_BASE_URL when WEB_URL is unset, matching base_host() precedence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ly (#10057) * [INFRA-1182] fix(security): make deploy board identity fields read-only DeployBoardSerializer now treats entity_identifier and entity_name as read-only alongside workspace, project and anchor; create already derives them from the URL project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1182] fix(security): address review Require a deploy board's intake to belong to the board's project on create and update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1182] fix(security): repair and guard mismatched deploy boards Migration 0125 points project boards at their own project; public Spaces endpoints 404 for a mismatched board. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ator access (#10058) allow_permission(creator=True) on project routes now requires the caller to be an active member of the URL project before the creator shortcut applies. The unused duplicate in plane/utils/permissions is kept identical. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…10059) * [INFRA-1189] fix(security): throttle auth endpoints for every caller AuthenticationThrottle now keys on the client IP for anonymous and signed-in callers. Apply it to instance-admin sign-in/sign-up and email-change code endpoints, and invalidate an email-change code after 5 wrong attempts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1205] fix(security): cap email-change codes per target address Limit email-change verification codes to 5 per hour per target address across all accounts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1189] fix(security): address review feedback - Email-change verify: count the attempt before comparing the code, and reject once the attempt budget is used up, so concurrent requests share one budget. - Add AuthenticationThrottle to ChangePasswordEndpoint. - Tests for both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1189] fix(security): address review feedback - Email-change verify counts the attempt before reading the stored code (same order as MagicCodeProvider), so a code invalidated by a concurrent request is never compared. Code and counter are still deleted together at the cap. - Test: a code deleted after the attempt is counted is not accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Sriram Veeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
#10060) * [INFRA-1194] fix(security): scope activity-task lookups to the issue's project/workspace issue_activity resolved request-supplied ids (related issues, labels, assignees, parent, estimate points, cycles, modules) without scope; they are now limited to the activity's project (workspace for relations and assignees) and skipped otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1194] fix(security): address review Scope relation activity to the activity's own issue, pass only related ids from the views, and require project membership for added assignees. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1194] fix(security): address review feedback - Add tests: an estimate point from another project is skipped and one from the issue's project is recorded; unassigning a deactivated member is recorded; deleting a relation to another project in the same workspace is recorded on both issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… task (#10062) Guests on projects without guest_view_all_features now export only the issues they created; membership join also excludes soft-deleted members. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tes (#10064) * [INFRA-1116] fix(security): restrict user-scoped FKs on users/me updates Notification preference user/workspace/project fields are now read-only. User avatar_asset/cover_image_asset accept only the user's own asset of the matching entity type, and replacing an avatar/cover deletes only the user's own asset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1116] fix(security): address review Use matching entity types for the foreign-asset test so it checks ownership alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1116] fix(security): address review feedback - Clear the avatar link in delete_old_avatar when the linked asset is not the user's own, leaving the asset untouched - Add a test for the login avatar sync with storage mocked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…elds (#10063) * [INFRA-1208] fix(security): limit public comment writes to content fields Public board comment create and edit now pass only comment_html and comment_json to the serializer; actor, access, issue and parent stay server-controlled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1208] fix(security): address review Limit app comment updates to content and access fields, including the activity payloads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1208] fix(security): address review feedback - Comment update activity: record a change only when comment_html is in the payload and differs. - Space comment PATCH: capture current_instance before saving. - App comment create: apply the same writable-field allowlist as partial_update (hoisted to COMMENT_WRITABLE_FIELDS) and pass the filtered data to model_activity. - Tests for all three. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Sriram Veeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
…0065) * [INFRA-1174] fix(security): scope project stats and grouping keys Project stats follow the project list visibility rules, the advance analytics overview counts members only of the caller's projects in the workspace, and workspace-level issue grouping builds project/state/cycle/module/label keys from the caller's projects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1174] fix(security): address review feedback - issue_group_values raises ValueError when called with neither project_id nor user - Add a unit test for it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1174] fix(security): address review feedback - Public board grouping (space issue_group_values) takes project, state, label, cycle and module keys only from the board's project. - Test: public issues endpoint grouped by project/state/cycle returns only keys from the board's project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…n see (#10066) * [INFRA-1163] fix(security): scope favorites to entities the caller can see Favorite creation now requires the entity to be in the URL workspace/project and visible to the caller; entity_data resolves under the same rule (get_favorite_entities). Covers INFRA-1163, INFRA-1170, INFRA-1172, INFRA-1185, INFRA-1186. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1163] fix(security): address review Resolve workspace view favorites via workspace membership and report the favorite's project for multi-project pages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1163] fix(security): address review feedback - Favorite PATCH only accepts name, sequence and parent, so the favorited entity can't be changed after creation - Add a test that PATCHing entity_type/entity_identifier leaves the row unchanged while sequence still updates Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…10067) * [INFRA-1166] fix(security): apply guest_view_all_features in search Search issue, page, view and intake queries now apply the guest rule per result project, inside the caller's membership join, matching the list views. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1166] fix(security): address review Keep private pages owner-only in global search, matching the page list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1166] fix(security): address review Keep private project views owner-only in global search, as the view list does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…10068) * [INFRA-1149] fix(security): apply entity role rules to asset changes Confirm, update and delete on the generic asset routes now follow the rule of the asset's entity: workspace admin for the logo, project admin for the cover, project admin or uploader for attachments, member or uploader otherwise (INFRA-1149, INFRA-1197). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1149] fix(security): address review Rename asset role tests after the permission rule each one covers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1149] fix(security): address review feedback - Asset restore applies the same role rule as update/delete (can_modify_asset) - Add a test: a project guest can't restore another user's deleted attachment, the uploader can - Tests assign the response before asserting on its status instead of making requests inside assert Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1149] fix(security): address review feedback - The legacy asset delete and restore routes (by asset path) apply can_modify_asset, like the v2 routes. - can_modify_asset: the uploader shortcut requires an active role in the asset's project, if it has one. - Tests: legacy delete/restore follow the role rules; an uploader with an inactive project membership cannot delete or restore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…10069) * [INFRA-1158] fix(security): require a non-empty matching OAuth state Add validate_oauth_state, which pops the session state and accepts the callback only when both values are non-empty and match (constant time). Use it in all eight app and space OAuth callbacks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1158] fix(security): address review Fall back to the app base host in the Gitea callback when the session has no host. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1158] fix(security): address review feedback - validate_oauth_state compares first and removes the stored state only on a match, so a mismatched callback no longer drops a pending login's state - Test: a mismatched callback followed by the matching one logs in - Add the app GitLab and Google callbacks to the state test matrix - Compare the parsed scheme and host in the app-host redirect test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… app (#10070) * [INFRA-1180] fix(security): bring v1 API permissions in line with the app v1 cycle delete is limited to project admins or the cycle creator, and a cycle update without owned_by keeps the current owner. v1 label writes require project admin. v1 project-member add requires an active workspace membership. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1180] fix(security): address review Check the target's active workspace membership on every member PATCH, and keep an explicit null cycle owner assigning the requester. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1180] fix(security): address review feedback - ProjectAdminPermission (both copies) now also admits a workspace admin who is a project member at any role, matching allow_permission. - v1 cycle delete reuses ProjectAdminPermission for its admin check. - Tests: a workspace admin with project role member can create labels and delete cycles; one outside the project cannot create labels. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nts (#10071) * [INFRA-1146] fix(security): scope public Space asset uploads to comment images Public asset uploads now require comments enabled on the board, accept only COMMENT_DESCRIPTION, and bind only to the caller's own EXTERNAL comment on it. The bulk endpoint binds only the caller's own comment images to such a comment (INFRA-1144). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1146] fix(security): address review Treat an empty comment id on upload as unbound and refuse bulk binding when board comments are disabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#10072) * [INFRA-1165] fix(security): reset role when rejoining a public project Self-joining a public project reactivated an inactive ProjectMember row with its previous role. Reactivation now sets the workspace role a new joiner gets, and only touches inactive rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1165] fix(security): address review feedback - Rejoin reactivation now also sets updated_by and updated_at, since .update() skips the model's save() hooks. - Test asserts updated_by on the reactivated membership. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ted writes (#10073) BaseSessionAuthentication.enforce_csrf now refuses unsafe requests whose Origin is not the request's own host, a configured base URL, or a CORS/CSRF trusted origin. Requests without an Origin header (non-browser clients) and safe methods are unaffected. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Review against current preview (6c16585)
A few changes suggested. The fixes are still needed; the project.py edits that landed in #10055/#10057 are in separate hunks.
- major
apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py:704:cursor.value=1000passes validation withper_page=1, so grouped pagination can return up to 1000 rows per group and the next cursor switches to 1, repeating rows. Suggest usingper_pagefor grouped offsets and limits (or rejecting a mismatched cursor value) and testing with a real grouped queryset. - minor
apps/api/plane/app/serializers/estimate.py:31:EstimatePointSerializer(used for PATCH) still has a writablecreated_by. Suggest making its audit fields read-only too. - minor
apps/api/plane/tests/unit/serializers/test_mass_assignment.py:34: New tests cover cycles and views, but none would fail if theProjectSerializerchange were removed. Suggest adding a project PATCH regression test. - nit
apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py:697: Suggest rewording the new comments and test docstrings to state the validation rule rather than describing the prior gap.
Notes from an automated review (Claude Code + Codex), checked against current preview.
…10061) * [INFRA-1195] fix(security): verify Redis TLS certificates by default rediss:// connections (redis_instance and the django-redis cache) now verify the server certificate and hostname. REDIS_SSL_CA_CERTS sets a custom CA bundle and REDIS_SSL_CERT_REQS=none turns verification off. Also covers INFRA-1210. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1195] fix(security): address review Honour ssl_cert_reqs from REDIS_URL when deciding hostname checks, and document mounting a custom CA bundle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1195] fix(security): address review feedback - AIO: document REDIS_SSL_CERT_REQS and REDIS_SSL_CA_CERTS in variables.env and the README, including a -v mount for the CA bundle. - AIO start.sh: pass both through from the container environment, so -e values are not replaced by the plane.env defaults. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1195] fix(security): address review feedback - REDIS_SSL_CERT_REQS=optional keeps hostname checking on; only none turns it off. - Tests: mapping for optional expects ssl_check_hostname=True, and a connection built with optional has check_hostname=True. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nstall (#10074) * [INFRA-1160] fix(security): generate object-storage credentials per install install.sh/swarm.sh generate random MinIO credentials on install and replace the template placeholders on upgrade; the CLI compose no longer falls back to them. setup.sh generates the pair for source builds, and settings drop the fallback and log a critical warning when MinIO runs with the placeholder pair. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1160] fix(security): address review feedback - The API warns when AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY is the template value, whatever the access key is. - install.sh and swarm.sh rotate whenever the secret is the template value (or empty), and ignore quotes from older templates when comparing. - docker-compose.yml keeps the access-key/secret-key fallbacks for MinIO and the API, so installs upgraded with an older setup.sh, or with blank keys, still start; the API warning covers them. - README: download the latest setup.sh before upgrading. - Test: custom access key with the template secret logs the warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1160] fix(security): address review feedback - Reword the comment above the storage credential warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ate limits (#10075) * [INFRA-1189] chore(security): make proxy hop count configurable for rate limits Add an optional NUM_PROXIES setting and pass TRUSTED_PROXIES/NUM_PROXIES through the CLI compose. Defaults are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * [INFRA-1189] fix(security): address review feedback - NUM_PROXIES accepts at most 3 digits, so an oversized value is ignored with a warning instead of failing settings load. - variables.env ships NUM_PROXIES= uncommented, so an upgrade keeps an operator's value; an empty value is still treated as unset. - README: "leaving NUM_PROXIES empty" matches the shipped template. - Test: a 5000-digit value keeps DRF's default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Grouped and sub-grouped paginators size each page by the validated per_page (limit), as OffsetPaginator does, instead of cursor.value. - EstimatePointSerializer: created_by/updated_by are read-only. - Add a ProjectSerializer partial-update test for the audit fields and a grouped/sub-grouped pagination test against a real queryset. - Reword comments and test docstrings to state the validation rules.
- TestCursorBounds: use a cursor value one above the maximum page size for the oversized case; the assertion is unchanged. - Reword the cursor-bound comment in paginate() to say the value runs up to the effective maximum page size.
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Approving: review points addressed and re-verified; CI green.
Summary
AppScan DAST remediation for SECUR-236 (plane-ee counterpart: makeplane/plane-ee#8591). This PR was trimmed to its unique, non-overlapping fixes after two parts were found to fully overlap existing open PRs against
preview:What remains in this PR
🟠 MEDIUM + 🟡 LOW — grouped-paginator cursor bound (not addressed by #9429)
GroupedOffsetPaginatortakes its per-group page size from the clientcursor.value, not the cappedlimit.cursor=1000000:0:0→ up to 1M rows/group (bypassesmax_per_page, DoS; reachable unauthenticated on public boards);cursor=-1:0:0→ negative queryset slice →ValueError→ HTTP 500. Fix bounds the parsed cursor (0 <= value <= max_per_page,offset >= 0) centrally inpaginate(). Regression tests:TestCursorBounds.🟡 LOW — Project mass-assignment
ProjectSerializer(fields="__all__") leftcreated_by/updated_byclient-writable;BaseModel.save()only backfillscreated_bywhenNone, so a supplied value survived — allowing ownership/attribution forgery. Fix: add them toread_only_fields.Testing
TestCursorBoundscovers reject (-1:0:0,1001:0:0,20:-1:0) + valid/at-max cursors.per_page(asOffsetPaginatoralready does);TestGroupedPageSizecovers this against a real issue queryset.TestAuditFieldsReadOnlycovers project, cycle and view partial updates;EstimatePointSerializeraudit fields are read-only too.Note
Merge order: this PR's per_page/auth coverage now lives in #9429 and #9335 respectively — those should land for full SECUR-236 coverage on CE.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Security