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feat(env): accept secret values on stdin with --value-stdin - #308

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@roodboi roodboi commented Oct 12, 2026 •

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Summary

HACK-1158 (part of HACK-1127). hack env add and hack env set now accept --value-stdin. You can pipe a value from a secret manager or a file, and it never appears in argv, shell history or process listings.

<secret-source> | hack env add SERVICE_TOKEN --service api --secret --value-stdin

Final behavior

  • Reads all of stdin up to 64 KiB. The reader stops and cancels the stream as soon as input goes over the limit, so an endless producer cannot exhaust memory.

  • Strips exactly one trailing newline (\n, or \r\n counted as one newline). Any further newlines stay in the value.

  • Refuses each of these with a fixed message that never includes the input. The refusal happens before any project file is migrated or written:

    • an interactive TTY on stdin
    • a value argument passed with the flag, including KEY=value
    • a missing key
    • empty input
    • input over 64 KiB
    • invalid UTF-8
    • a NUL byte
  • Works on the modern YAML path and on the legacy env set path (keychain or encrypted_file backends).

  • The non-TTY E_INTERACTIVE_REQUIRED hints in src/commands/env.ts no longer tell you to pass the value as an argument. They now point to --value-stdin or the hidden prompt.

  • Docs and guidance:

    • docs/env.md gains an "Entering secret values" section.
    • docs/reference/cli.md is regenerated.
    • Canonical guidance (instruction-source.ts, env composition) and the onboarding prompt now say to pipe secrets with --value-stdin and never pass them as arguments.
    • The plugin bundle and the checked-in examples (.codex, .cursor, examples/basic) are updated.
    • The content revision is bumped, and the new render fingerprints for hack-cli-skill and cursor-rules are appended to the existing lists.
  • Invalid key and scope arguments are refused with fixed text that names the allowed pattern but never echoes the argument. Before this, hack env add KEY=value printed "Invalid env key: KEY=", and hack env materialize --service KEY=value printed "Unknown env scope: KEY=".

    • Keys: env add/set/unset/explain/get, the legacy env set/unset path, setProjectEnvValue, and malformed keys in env config files. env add validates the key before reading stdin or migrating files.
    • Scopes: every --service/--scope value is validated in src/cli/env-arguments.ts before project migration, file access or any child process. This covers env materialize/exec/shell/list/apply/get and host exec/shell. env apply no longer forwards a malformed --service to its hack restart child.
    • Unknown scopes: selectProjectEnvValues and resolveProjectEnvValue now use one fixed "Unknown env scope" message. It lists configured scope names from compose and env files, never the request. Scope lookups use Object.hasOwn, so constructor or __proto__ count as unknown.
    • env get key/scope parsing is now parseEnvGetArguments, tested directly. The command's generic error wrapper would otherwise hide a re-echo.
    • Proven by tests/env-key-argument-redaction-cli.test.ts. It runs the real CLI with a canary in the key or scope for each command. The canary must be absent from stdout, stderr and spawned argv/env, no non-git child may start, and project files must be unchanged. Run against the previous head, the new scope cases fail with the canary in stderr. Source mutations that re-echo the argument, skip scope validation, or reorder validation each fail the suite. These include a library-only unknown-scope echo, skipping exec/apply scope validation, and an env get key echo that the CLI wrapper hides.
  • --env, --project and --target values are no longer slugged or echoed. Before this, --env X=<value> became the overlay name x<value>, was printed as env_selection, and hack env add ... --env X=<value> created .hack/hack.env.x<value>.yaml. --project x=<value> printed Unknown project "x<value>", and --target x=<value> was echoed as given.

    • --env: parseEnvConfigSelection (shared by the CLI and the daemon env routes) no longer rewrites a requested name. Apart from surrounding whitespace, the value must already match ^[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$. base, default and none (any case) and an empty value still select base layers. Anything else, including any value with = or uppercase letters, gets one fixed Invalid --env value. message that states the rule and never the argument. runCli checks the shared --env option before any handler runs, so every command that accepts --env refuses before project discovery, migration, file access, stdin or a child process. env apply forwards the checked selection to hack restart, not the raw argument; an empty --env now forwards base, which matches the grammar.
    • --project on env/host commands: parseProjectSelectorOption refuses an argument that contains = or any character other than letters, digits, -, _, space and /. The refusal is fixed text and happens before the registry is read. Legacy alias spellings such as My_App still select my-app. Unknown project echoes a name only when it was typed in canonical form.
    • --target: the refusal lists only the allowed values (host, compose). env explain/exec/shell and host exec/shell now check --env and --target before they resolve the project.
    • docs/env.md now states the overlay name rule. Before, it said that names are normalized.
    • Proven by four new CLI tests in tests/env-key-argument-redaction-cli.test.ts. The list of commands comes from CLI_SPEC: every command that accepts --env, and every env/host command that accepts --project. Each command runs as the real CLI with canaries in --env, --project and --target. The tests check that the canary, and its lowercased slug form, is absent from stdout, stderr and spawned argv/env. They also check that no non-git child starts, that no file under the temp root has the canary in its name, and that project files are unchanged. The --env refusal is also checked from a directory without .hack/, which proves it happens before project discovery. Base aliases still work. A unit test covers parseEnvConfigSelection and parseProjectSelectorOption.
    • Mutations, each reverted after the run: putting slugging back in parseEnvConfigSelection, removing the runCli --env check, dropping the --project pattern, echoing a slugged unknown project, and echoing --target. Each one failed the new tests.

Validation

  • tests/env-value-stdin.test.ts (in-process, stdin source injected), covering:

    • trailing newline, CRLF and multi-newline handling
    • multi-byte characters split across chunks
    • input exactly at the limit, and oversize input (an endless stream is canceled after a bounded number of pulls)
    • empty and newline-only input
    • a TTY stdin is refused before the stream is opened
    • invalid UTF-8, NUL bytes, and read failures (the error drops its cause)
    • usage checks, and that every refusal message is fixed and value-free
  • tests/env-value-stdin-cli.test.ts runs the CLI in fresh subprocesses. Each run gets:

    • a temp HOME and temp global config
    • a minimal environment
    • a --preload recorder (tests/fixtures/spawn-argv-recorder.ts) that logs argv and env for every Bun.spawn, Bun.spawnSync and child_process call

    Stores are either the project-key YAML store or an injected encrypted_file backend with an env-provided key. No keychain, no 1Password, no Docker, and no agent client config. The tests check that:

    • the value is absent from stdout, stderr, the spawn argv/env log and the project files, and that it round-trips exactly
    • ps -ww -o args= for the waiting CLI process does not contain the value
    • all four positional+stdin forms are refused without echoing the value and without changing any file
    • oversize, empty and missing-key input is refused and nothing is stored
    • the non-TTY hint names --value-stdin
    • the legacy env set --secret --value-stdin path writes through encrypted_file
  • Required checks:

    • tests/integration-ownership.test.ts, tests/agent-plugin-generation.test.ts, tests/agent-instruction-source.test.ts, tests/onboarding-prompt.test.ts, tests/cli-reference-docs.test.ts, tests/runtime-guidance.test.ts
    • the existing env suites (env-command-modern, env-backend-command, env-get, env, env-command-matrix, interactivity, cli-help, project-env-worktree-key, env-selection-parity)
    • bun run --cwd packages/cli typecheck
    • bun run --cwd packages/cli check (0 errors)
    • For the --env/--project/--target fix (head b1bc6db2), these all passed locally: the env suites (compose-managed-env, daemon-env, env-backend-command, env-command-matrix, env-command-modern, env-exec-command, env-get, env-key-argument-redaction-cli, env-selection-parity, env-value-stdin, env-value-stdin-cli, env, hack-env, project-env-*, project-lifecycle-env, session-env-command, native-env-*), plus integration-ownership, agent-plugin-generation, project-execution-routing, cli-*, session-command and native-config-compiler; root bun run typecheck; and bun run check (warnings only, none in changed files). docs/reference/cli.md regenerates unchanged.

Negative controls

  • Unit: the leak detector is shown to catch a value placed in a CliUsageError message, and also an 8-character fragment of the value.
  • CLI: I temporarily changed handleEnvAdd to throw a refusal that contains the positional value. The positional+stdin test then failed on expect(stderr).not.toContain(SENTINEL). I reverted the change and did not commit it.
  • The spawn recorder is shown to be live: the log of the write path contains the tracked-file probe that the env write makes.
  • The output scan is shown to be live: hack env get of the stored key returns the value on stdout.

Remaining gaps

  • The macOS keychain backend is not exercised (by design: tests must not touch the real keychain). It stores values through Bun.secrets, which takes no argv. The stdin path hands it the same string as the prompt path does.
  • No real-terminal (pty) end-to-end test of the TTY refusal. The TTY branch is covered by an injected isTTY source.
  • Outside env/host commands, --project still slugs its argument and echoes the slug in Unknown project "<slug>". This affects src/commands/project.ts, branch.ts, config.ts, tui.ts, remote.ts, gateway.ts and project-admin.ts. The --target refusal for up/down/restart (src/lib/project-execution.ts) also still echoes its argument. Both are out of scope for this change and need the same fix.
  • An --env spelling that used to be normalized (for example QA or my_overlay) is now refused. Use the canonical name instead.
  • The env apply change, which forwards the checked selection, has no end-to-end test, because running the hack restart child would reach Docker.
  • Hosted CI has not run yet on this head.

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roodboi and others added 30 commits October 11, 2026 21:28
Add a data-only matrix (src/agents/client-capabilities.ts) that classifies
packaging, skill discovery, hooks, plugin MCP, standalone MCP, rules and UI
for Codex, Claude Code, Cursor and standalone consumers. Each cell records
status, evidence class, evidence ref, observed client version, source SHA
and host label. The rendered reference doc carries companion-package layout
and model-policy ownership decisions.

Tests enforce that every cell is classified, verified cells cite an existing
fixture-strength test, manifest or listing evidence never verifies loading,
and manifest-declared components agree with the matrix. The plugin
generation test gains a negative-controlled scan of plugins/hack and
examples/basic for model, permission and output-style settings and
non-primer hooks, plus a skill inventory check against the generator and
docs/integrations.md, which now names all four shipped skills.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hack.project.run built `run <flags> <service> <cmd...>`, so hack's own
parser consumed child flags: `node --version` printed hack's version and
`--branch other` retargeted the instance. Run now emits
`run <flags> -- <service> <cmd...>` and every option value is fused as
`--opt=value` across all tools.

- Validate service, services, branch, profiles, logs service and open
  target against a compose-identifier pattern (no leading '-', no empty
  value; branches may also contain '/').
- tail, maxEvents, maxMs and timeoutMs are positive integers with hard
  ceilings (provisional F27 settings); effective limits are echoed in
  data.limits.
- Every tool carries annotations (readOnly for list/status/logs/open,
  destructive for down/run/init, openWorld false).
- Refusals return error{code, message} with existing codes (E_USAGE,
  E_PROJECT_NOT_FOUND) and spawned:false. A typed tools/call dispatcher
  validates before any handler runs, so refused calls leave no argv
  entry and no audit line.
- Children spawn with HACK_NO_INTERACTIVE=1 on a copy of the frozen
  session env.

Refs HACK-1133, HACK-1134

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Legacy project env key reads (checkout-local, shared common-dir and
inherited primary keys) now use the same lstat, O_NOFOLLOW, size-bound and
stable-descriptor discipline as the native reader, extracted into
src/lib/private-file.ts. Key priority is unchanged. A symlinked, dangling,
oversized or non-regular key file is refused with a fixed message.

New key files are created with open(O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_WRONLY,
0600), fchmod 0600 and fsync, so an existing entry or dangling symlink is
never followed or replaced. A concurrent creator's key is adopted.

Encryption (env add --secret and the legacy migration) refuses a git-tracked
selected or inherited key with a fixed, value-free message before any key
copy. Decryption with a tracked key stays allowed for v4 compatibility.

Legacy v1 values and the encrypted_file store now require canonical base64,
a 12-byte IV, a 16-byte tag (authTagLength pinned) and a bounded ciphertext;
all parse, tamper and wrong-key failures use fixed redacted errors. The
envelope format, key derivation and v1 decryptability are unchanged.

Refs HACK-1127

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nfig

Address verifier findings on the agent-client capability matrix:

- Move the matrix renderer into scripts/generate-agent-client-capabilities.ts
  and add `bun run docs:agent-client-capabilities` (with `--check`), which
  rewrites only the generated section. The test compares the committed
  section with the rendered one and covers marker failures with closed codes.
- Scope the model/permission policy scan to generated guidance surfaces
  (plugins/hack, .claude-plugin, .cursor-plugin, .agents through its skill
  symlinks, and the example agent configuration) instead of example compose
  files. Parse YAML and markdown frontmatter as YAML, fail closed on
  structured-config formats the scan cannot parse, and count a file as
  scanned only when it was parsed.
- Treat reasoning-effort keys (reasoning_effort, model_reasoning_effort,
  frontmatter `effort`, nested effort/reasoning keys) as forbidden model
  settings, with negative controls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every pre-spawn refusal now comes from a closed catalogue (MCP_REFUSALS):
error {code, reason, message} uses an existing code, a closed reason and a
fixed message, and stderr repeats that message. Project names, ids, paths
and registry values are no longer echoed. Schema refusals name only keys
of the tool's own input schema.

An unknown tool name returns the SDK's in-band isError text result again
instead of a JSON-RPC -32602 protocol error, with a fixed message that
omits the requested name.

A canary test drives every refusal reason and the unknown-tool path and
asserts the canary never appears in the result, with no spawn or audit line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ting tests

Seal authentic envelopes with 8- and 16-byte IVs and with ciphertext one
byte over each parser bound, so only the parser guards can refuse them, and
assert through a createDecipheriv spy that structural refusals happen before
any decipher and that successful opens pass authTagLength 16. Covers the
legacy project env, encrypted_file store and native env value parsers, with
at-bound 12-byte-IV controls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Interactive `hack init` now prints a non-mutating note that points at the
optional Hack plugin and `hack agent onboard`. Repository-local export of
Cursor rules, Claude hooks, Codex skills, AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md sections and
project MCP config is a separate opt-in whose confirm defaults to no and
whose target list starts empty. The decision moves out of project.ts into
src/agents/init-agent-integrations.ts.

Doctor and the agent-prime freshness inventory now treat absent optional
integrations as current. Doctor flags a path only when it exists and lacks
the current revision marker (AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md only when they carry a
Hack-managed section). integration-sync counts only stale or errored
checks; user-owned docs without a Hack section are not drift; retired
legacy artifacts still are.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
config plan and config validate only treated the literal "base" as the
base selection, so `--env default` (and DEFAULT/none) reached the native
compiler as an overlay named "default" while env get, env list and the
runtime commands selected base layers.

Every CLI command that accepts --env now resolves it through one shared
resolver (src/cli/env-selection.ts): omitted keeps the configured default
overlay, base/default/none in any case select base layers, other names are
normalized, and a non-empty value with no usable name characters is refused
with the fixed "Invalid --env value." usage error instead of silently
selecting base. Authored native dispatch uses the same resolver, and
session workspace names stay env-base.

docs/env.md gains a command and delivery matrix with one row per CLI_SPEC
command that accepts --env; tests/env-command-matrix.test.ts keeps the rows
and selector flags in sync with CLI_SPEC. The canonical agent guidance gains
an env-composition section linking to the matrix; the content revision,
plugin bundle, repository examples and CLI reference are regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the W10 verifier findings so integration sync and doctor agree:

- checkAgentDocs marks a doc `unmanaged` only when it has neither the
  Hack start nor end marker. A doc with exactly one marker is a corrupted
  managed section and now reports a malformed-marker error, which sync
  counts as drift. Doctor treats the same doc as stale.
- Add readOptionalTextFile, which uses lstat before reading so callers
  can tell "absent" from "present but unreadable". The Cursor rules,
  Codex skill, shared skill, hack-init skill and agent-doc checks now
  report an unreadable existing file as `error` (drift) instead of
  `missing` (optional, current). Doctor uses the same helper.
- Add regression tests for start-only and end-only docs, plus mode-000
  Hack-owned files and docs in fixture HOME/project roots, for both
  sync and doctor.

Default `hack init` still writes no repository files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The env add --secret refusal tests asserted the refusal text on stderr, but
the default logger backend depends on the host: gum (stderr) when installed,
clack (stdout) otherwise. Hosted macOS runners have no gum, so the refusal
reached stdout and stderr was empty only in CI. Pin HACK_LOGGER=console in
the CLI helper, matching the other CLI-spawning tests, so the stderr
assertions hold on every host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The project-name boundary suite still expected the old value-echoing
"Ambiguous project name/ID" stderr from MCP. Assert the closed
MCP_REFUSALS contract instead: exact code, reason and fixed message,
spawned: false, no argv, and none of the duplicated names, registry ids
or fixture root anywhere in the serialized result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Temporary measurement only; reverted before the final commit. Writes closed
labels and durations per native command to a per-scenario JSONL file and
prints a summary in the docker-e2e job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A storage-bearing saved exec ran three full witness proofs (nine helper
carriers) and a warm up/restart seven. Within one command and one mutation
lease, an adjacent repeat with only read-only checks between it and the
previous proof now reuses that completed kernel proof instead of three new
helper carriers:

- saved exec: the pre-spawn check reuses the preparation proof; the proof
  after the process stays fresh (3 -> 2 proofs);
- up/restart without build, routing or file material: the first pre-spawn
  guard reuses the enrollment proof (warm 7 -> 6, cold seed path 6 -> 5).

Reuse requires the same lease authority, engine, generation and reference
and a byte-identical opening material binding to the one that opened and
closed the recorded proof. Every host check (anchors, expectation,
completion, binding, carrier artifact and lifetime) still runs; any
verification consumes the record first, so a failure or binding change
forces a fresh proof. Ordinary verification always proves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reverts the hosted measurement commit (closed-label cost trace, phase-trace
routing, per-scenario summary step and artifact) now that the per-phase and
per-call attribution is recorded in the pull request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The networks scenario took 3409 s on next with three proofs per storage exec
and ran 2275 s on the hosted engine with the coalesced proofs, so the 80 min
budget raise from the witness recovery change returns to 60 min. The budget
bounds a hung engine; no assertion or command deadline changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Storage witness proofs keep every fence; three exact costs are cut:

- Engine-ID fences: for an explicit DOCKER_HOST=unix:///... selection, the
  first fence of a command under one exact binding (selection, docker
  executable, client config and socket identities) still uses `docker info`
  and must equal one direct GET /info on that socket; only then do later
  fences under that unchanged binding each make one fresh direct request
  instead of a CLI process that lists every client plugin. A refused
  admission keeps the CLI, a moved binding re-admits through the CLI, and an
  admitted direct failure refuses without fallback. Two exact back-to-back
  ID reads with nothing between them are collapsed (holder observation into
  carrier inspect; provision fence into the target observation).
- Recorded command executables: the content digest is cached for one command
  by canonical path and complete stat identity (dev, ino, size, mtime and
  ctime in ns, mode, uid); every identity check still runs, any change
  re-reads, and racily fresh files are never cached.
- Target observations: the witness's closing re-observation of a
  deferred-finish verify invocation is answered by the carrier's own closing
  observation of the same query when the rechecked material binding is
  unchanged and only reads ran between (one observation per proof).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Temporary measurement only; reverted before the final commit. Re-applies the
X01 closed-label trace (reverting eb9a678) and adds point events for direct
engine-ID reads and admissions, cached executable digests, target observations
and reused closing observations, plus a shard 1 identity fence benchmark.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An admitted direct engine-ID read that fails because the caller cancelled or
its probe deadline expired now reports the CLI probe's existing closed
cancel/timeout classification; that probe refuses before spawning anything.
Every other admitted direct failure still refuses without CLI fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Per command on the synthetic engine: 81 of 86 engine-ID fences and 20 of 21
  target observations per proof, with every proof kept; an admitted explicit
  Unix selection uses one CLI fence per command.
- A changed daemon ID between two admitted fences refuses before any helper,
  workload or state change; a refused admission keeps every fence on the CLI.
- A target change right after the verify carrier's closing observation is
  refused by the next remaining observation.
- Admission, re-admission, no-fallback and cancellation controls on a real
  Unix server; executable digest reuse, replacement, same-size tamper, mode,
  racy-fresh and mid-command replacement controls.
- Reference docs describe the three cuts and their limits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Measurement is complete; the hosted trace run was 38211327829.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… catalogue

Plugin skills can now ship references at skills/<skill>/references/*.md from
a typed registry (src/agents/skill-references.ts). The generator writes each
reference with a recomputable content revision, removes stale ones, and links
them from the plugin SKILL.md. Standalone hack-cli installs ship no
references, so their render (and ownership fingerprint) is unchanged.

The first reference is the hack-cli pattern catalogue, rendered from the typed
register of all twelve HACK-P cards with dispositions, owners, missing
contracts and value-free provenance. Tests check completeness, CLI_SPEC
command resolution, a banned-recipe scan outside negative-example blocks, and
an offline link contract over every packaged skill markdown file. External
URLs in hack-install and hack-remote move under "Further reading".

docs/agent-guidance.md records the reference contract and the promote/defer
decision for the lifecycle, cleanup, checks, sessions, hack-run and
hack-feedback skill candidates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seed an isolated HOME with sentinel Claude, Codex, Cursor and shared-skill
config (including stale hack-cli copies) and two fixtures with customized
AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, rules, skill copies, settings.local.json and .mcp.json.
Run init --auto, init --auto --with codex, agent prime, agent prime --check,
agent onboard, agent patterns, doctor --json, doctor --fix --no-interactive
and setup sync --check twice each with HOME and HACK_HOME overridden, and
require byte-identical hashes, no new client entries, git status changes only
under .hack/, and each command's expected exit code. An explicit
setup agents --agents-md is the positive control and must change exactly
AGENTS.md.

Docker is pointed at a missing socket and Mutagen at a stub so doctor --fix
stays free of Docker and network effects; the hackd it starts is stopped.
The scenario is registered in ALL_SCENARIOS and shard.ts places it in
exactly one docker-e2e shard via the default duration hint.

Refs: HACK-1124, HACK-1132, HACK-1155

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HACK-1211 needs a matched, bounded way to reproduce the intermittent Bun
crash and a repeatable record of crashes per hosted run. This adds the
instruments only; it changes no test, timeout, assertion or pin.

- bun-crash-experiment.yml runs only on workflow_dispatch or when the
  bun-crash-experiment label is added to a pull request. A labeled pull
  request runs the matched pair (1.3.9 baseline, 1.4.2 candidate) on its
  head; a dispatch runs one version at a chosen revision. It uses
  blacksmith-6vcpu-macos-15, contents: read, and timeout = budget + 15.
  The instrument comes from the workflow's commit, so older revisions
  can be measured.
- scripts/bun-crash-loop.ts alternates the native HTTPS owner test with
  the full bun test. It never starts an iteration whose estimate (its
  initial guess or longest observed run) ends past the budget, and
  records a run still going at the deadline as overrun, not a crash. It
  writes a closed summary and keeps logs plus bun*.ips reports for a
  7-day artifact. It never opens crash-report links.
- scripts/ci-bun-crash-census.ts reads every attempt's test job through
  the caller's gh, downloads only failed-job logs into an owned temp dir
  that it removes, and prints per-version counts and crashing ids only.
- Both use scripts/lib/bun-crash-classify.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tions

Storage-witness engine-ID admissions now resolve the Docker CLI's endpoint
selection the way the CLI does: a nonempty DOCKER_HOST, then DOCKER_CONTEXT,
then the client config's currentContext, then the default context at
unix:///var/run/docker.sock. A named context is read from its
contexts/meta/<sha256>/meta.json through a no-follow binding; only a plain
unix:/// docker endpoint with no TLS option, no unknown or duplicate field and
no entry at the context's TLS path is eligible. TLS material is checked for
absence by name and never opened. Missing, malformed, linked, TCP, SSH, TLS or
header-bearing contexts, and DOCKER_HOST with DOCKER_CONTEXT, keep the CLI.

Admission is unchanged: the first fence under a binding is the CLI read and
must equal one direct GET /info on the resolved socket. The binding now also
pins the context store entry and the absent TLS path, so a changed config,
context entry, socket or executable is admitted through the CLI again. The
ingress and VM-file observers, trusted without a CLI comparison, still accept
only an explicit Unix DOCKER_HOST.

Tests that run commands against a synthetic docker now pin an isolated client
config naming a missing context, so they never read the contributor's Docker
config or dial a real engine socket. A new opt-in test (HACK_TEST_DOCKER_CLI=1,
run on docker-e2e shard 4) runs the real Docker CLI against two fake Unix
engines for every selection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Temporary measurement only; reverted before the final commit. Re-applies the
X03 closed-label trace (6a4e118) without its identity benchmark, labels each
engine-ID admission with its selection kind (host, default or context), counts
direct reads as trace leaves, and prints the runner's Docker client selection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Measurement is complete; the hosted trace run was 38225752202.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
roodboi and others added 9 commits October 12, 2026 10:10
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in; no content change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in; no content change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in; no content change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in. next's tree equals train/queue-preview 77da332, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is kept unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in. next's tree equals train/queue-preview 77da332, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is kept unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in. next's tree equals train/queue-preview 77da332, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is kept unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in. next's tree equals train/queue-preview 77da332, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is kept unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Picks up the re-parent onto next; no content change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-parents onto next after the queued PRs squashed in. next's tree equals train/queue-preview 77da332, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is kept unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@roodboi
roodboi changed the base branch from train/queue-preview to next October 12, 2026 14:19
roodboi and others added 8 commits October 12, 2026 10:21
Stack PR #302 on PR #311.

Conflicted files: none. The two change sets are disjoint (#302:
env-file and secret-store hygiene; #311: src/ui/gum.ts with its tests
and fixture), so git merged them cleanly. No generated files changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. Git auto-merged the only shared file:
- docs/env.md: kept both sides' text (the env key doctor notes from this
  branch and the private env file and encrypted_file store notes from
  wf/y3-envfile-b6).

No generated files changed: neither branch alters CLI options or rendered
agent guidance, so plugins, docs/reference/cli.md, integration-revision.ts
and KNOWN_RENDER_FINGERPRINTS needed no update.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. The merge applied cleanly; the two change sets
touch disjoint files.

Regenerated plugins (generate:agent-plugins) and docs/reference/cli.md
(docs:cli-reference) after the merge; both produced no changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. The merge was clean; the two change sets touch
disjoint files. Regenerated agent plugins and docs/reference/cli.md
produced no diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stack PR #301 on PR #307. The merge had no textual conflicts.
Git auto-merged docs/env.md, tests/e2e/run.ts and tests/e2e/shard.ts;
each keeps both sides (stale env warning plus env key/private file docs;
both exec-stale-env and compose-config-hash-drift scenarios and hints).
Regenerated plugins and docs/reference/cli.md produced no drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. The two change sets touch disjoint files, so git
merged them automatically. Generated surfaces (plugin bundle, CLI reference,
checked-in renders) were regenerated after the merge and showed no drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. The plain merge applied cleanly.

Regenerated surfaces (generate:agent-plugins, docs:cli-reference)
produced no changes, so integration-revision.ts and
KNOWN_RENDER_FINGERPRINTS are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicted files: none. Git merged both sides cleanly; docs/env.md and
src/lib/project-env-config.ts were changed by both branches and
auto-merged with both sides' content kept.

Generated files: bun run generate:agent-plugins and
bun run docs:cli-reference produced no changes. The checked-in renders
(.codex/skills/hack-cli, .codex/skills/hack-init, .claude/skills/hack-init,
.cursor/rules/hack.mdc, examples/basic AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md) are
byte-equal to their install/render functions run against a temp project
root. integration-revision.ts and KNOWN_RENDER_FINGERPRINTS keep the
wf/c1-stdin-b7 values; wf/y2-mcptools-b6 did not change guidance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@roodboi
roodboi changed the base branch from next to wf/y2-mcptools-b6 October 12, 2026 14:38
#308 makes --env require a canonical overlay name instead of slugging input, so ' QA ' is now refused before any project work. Keep the native dispatch case on the documented path with ' qa ' (still exercises trimming); the refusal itself is covered by the env argument redaction tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
roodboi added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2026
Picks up the native env selection test update from #308.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
roodboi added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2026
Picks up the native env selection test update from #308.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
roodboi added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2026
Picks up the native env selection test update from #308.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Base automatically changed from wf/y2-mcptools-b6 to next October 12, 2026 19:07
Re-parents onto next after the previous stacked PR squashed in; next's tree equals 642775e, which this branch already contains, so the branch tree is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@roodboi
roodboi marked this pull request as ready for review October 12, 2026 19:07
@roodboi
roodboi merged commit 321bd59 into next Oct 12, 2026
14 of 15 checks passed
@roodboi
roodboi deleted the wf/c1-stdin-b7 branch October 12, 2026 19:07
@blacksmith-sh

blacksmith-sh Bot commented Oct 12, 2026

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Found 10 test failures on Blacksmith runners:

Failures

Test View Logs
domain-migration (0.0s) — Host ingress qualification requires HACK_E2E_DOCKER=1/
domain-migration (0.0s) — Host ingress qualification requires HACK_E2E_DOCKER=1
View Logs
domain-migration (0.0s) — Set HACK_E2E_DOMAIN_ROUTING=1 to use the existing shared Cadd
y ingress/
domain-migration (0.0s) — Set HACK_E2E_DOMAIN_ROUTING=1 to use the existing shared Cadd
y ingress
View Logs
incomplete-owned-cleanup (0.0s) — Owned cleanup refused/
incomplete-owned-cleanup (0.0s) — Owned cleanup refused
View Logs
native-fixture (0.0s) — missing fixture prerequisite/
native-fixture (0.0s) — missing fixture prerequisite
View Logs
ordinary-fixture-cleanup (0.0s) — Earlier assertion failure after complete cleanup/
ordinary-fixture-cleanup (0.0s) — Earlier assertion failure after complete cleanup
View Logs
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted./
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted.
View Logs
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted./
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted.
View Logs
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted./
owned-evidence-control (0.0s) — Synthetic fixture refusal; values omitted.
View Logs
retained-no-success (0.0s) — missing prerequisite after retained cleanup/
retained-no-success (0.0s) — missing prerequisite after retained cleanup
View Logs
retained-no-success (0.0s) — Scenario cleanup is incomplete; owned fixtures are retaine
d for recovery/
retained-no-success (0.0s) — Scenario cleanup is incomplete; owned fixtures are retaine
d for recovery
View Logs

Fix with [code]smith
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