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deps(frontend): update dependency storybook to v10.6.2 [security] - #8833
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✅ oss · depot-ubuntu-latest-16 — run #22652 (attempt 1)Playwright Test Results (oss - depot-ubuntu-latest-16)
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Skipped testsfirefox › tests/onboarding-tests.pw.ts › Onboarding › New user connects via the single-page onboarding flow @oss |
This PR contains the following updates:
10.6.0→10.6.2Storybook: Missing origin validation in Storybook preview allows code injection from malicious websites
CVE-2026-114125 / GHSA-f2ph-cmg5-wxc8
More information
Details
Summary: A malicious website may be able to cause unauthorized file changes in a developer’s project while an affected Storybook development server is running. Under additional conditions, a changed file could be executed by a local runtime with the developer’s privileges. We are not aware of exploitation in the wild.
Who is impacted?
You are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server in the affected versions.
You are not impacted if:
Recent versions of Chrome and Firefox may ask for permission before a website can connect to a
localhostservice. This reduces the risk, but does not remove it. Do not grant this permission to websites you don’t trust.Recommended actions
Upgrade Storybook
Storybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur.
Upgrade to a patched version listed below before running
storybook devagain. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix.Review potentially breaking changes
Due to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users' workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, we've added feature flags that can disable specific security updates to support your existing workflows.
Please carefully read the introduced flags and the consequences of using them.
Iframe embedding over the network is disabled by default
Storybook no longer allows the manager or preview to be embedded as an iframe on a website with a different host name. Built versions of Storybook are unaffected and can be freely embedded.
If you rely on embedding a Storybook dev server through a separate web app, run that separate app on
localhost. You may also use thesecurity.insecureRemoteIframeEmbedfeature flag to re-enable iframe embedding from any origin.The preview iframe rejects messages sent by an unknown host
Both the Storybook preview and manager now restrict the origin of iframes and parent windows that they can send messages to and receive messages from using the
postMessageAPI.By default, Storybook in dev mode only accepts communication with its own origin and other
localhostservices. Built Storybooks continue to accept communication from unknown origins.A Storybook addon or integration could hypothetically rely on
postMessageto update a live story's args. If you do that, reach out to the Storybook team to explore safer alternatives.Storybook composition also relies on
postMessage, so a composed Storybook on a different origin now fails to load unless it has been built. Thesecurity.insecureIframeMessagingfeature flag disables this protection, but we recommend you build composed Storybooks instead.The
highlightevent signature has changedStorybook’s own accessibility addon uses the
highlightevent to inject highlights into the preview, which a user can click. Clicking the highlight opens a menu with a link to a documentation page.The API for that event was too permissive and could be used to trigger arbitrary events, including events processed by the user’s dev server. We reworked the API to prevent abuse. Besides the accessibility addon, Chromatic's Visual Tests addon uses this API to link to documentation from highlighted ignored elements. Update the Visual Tests addon to version 5.5.1 or later to keep that link working. Because no other addons use this API as far as we know, we have not added a feature flag to restore the old API.
Disclosure timeline
On September 30th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing how a malicious website can embed a Storybook dev server's preview iframe and send events to the dev server on the developer's machine.
They combined this information with findings from an ongoing security audit to come up with a worst-case-scenario exploitation of the disclosed vulnerability, and the ones we independently discovered. They then worked to address all layers necessary for this worst-case scenario to happen. We have not received evidence of exploitation in real Storybook projects. The attack outlined in this advisory relies on correctly exploiting a sequence of many vulnerabilities, some of which were never disclosed to the Storybook team.
Worst-case attack scenario
An attacker-controlled website can interact with the preview of a running Storybook dev server. With user interaction, it may cause the dev server to make unauthorized changes to story files. If a malicious file is subsequently executed by a local runtime, the attack could lead to arbitrary code execution with the developer’s permissions.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Storybook dev server vulnerable to code injection from the local network
CVE-2026-114126 / GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77
More information
Details
Summary: The Storybook dev server exposes its WebSocket authentication token to any client that can load its HTML pages. Any host on a LAN can open a Storybook app by IP address, and therefore obtain the token. The WebSocket can be used to inject code into story files or to create new files. Under the right circumstances, an attacker can execute code on the machine of a developer connected on the same LAN.
Who is impacted?
You are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server whilst connected on an untrusted local network, or to a WiFi access point posing as a trusted network. The impact of this advisory is more important if you have the Vitest addon installed and are using an old version of Vitest.
You are not impacted if:
127.0.0.1)Recommended actions
Upgrade Storybook
Storybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur.
Upgrade to a patched version listed below before running
storybook devagain. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix.Review potentially breaking changes
Due to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users' workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, this document explains how to fall back to the previous behavior.
Storybook now only listens on
127.0.0.1by defaultBy default, the Storybook dev server no longer binds to all network interfaces on your machine. It only binds to the loopback address
127.0.0.1. You can still open it athttp://localhost:6006. This prevents other devices on the same network from seeing your Storybook server.To share a Storybook with others, consider publishing it to Chromatic (free). To share it on a LAN without exposing the dev server, build a static Storybook with
storybook buildand serve the output folder with any static file server.To share a live Storybook running in dev mode, you can use the
--hostCLI option to bind to the LAN IP you want to share Storybook on, e.g.storybook dev --host 192.168.0.110. Host and origin validation stays enabled with this option. If you use--host 0.0.0.0instead, also setcore.allowedHoststo the hostnames you will use. Without it, host and origin validation is disabled, and Storybook shows a warning and asks you to confirm before it starts.Consider using a firewall to restrict incoming packets to known colleague IPs, and avoid using
--hoston an untrusted WiFi network.The Vitest addon now disables
browser.api.allowWriteandbrowser.api.allowExecStorybook no longer allows code running in Vitest Browser mode to write to the developer’s machine or execute other processes. In the unlikely scenario that you rely on this capability in your tests, you can manually re-enable these APIs in your Vitest config.
The
saveStoryRequestevent validates input more strictlyStorybook strengthened input validation in
saveStoryRequest, so addons and the Storybook UI can now only write serialized args and story titles. It is no longer possible to exploit input validation weaknesses to e.g. writeplayfunctions with a custom addon.If you develop an addon that writes or edits files on users’ behalf, reach out to the Storybook team to get advice on security best practice.
Disclosure timeline
On August 19th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing that the WebSocket token can be stolen by an attacker sharing a LAN with a Storybook dev server.
The disclosure identified several actions an attacker can do. An attacker can bypass input validation to write a payload in a story file.
They can then trigger a test run via the WebSocket. If the Vitest addon is installed, the payload can exploit a Vitest API to write other files, with more exploit logic to the user’s filesystem.
Depending on the exploit content, where the file is written, and what software the developer uses, that exploit could then be executed.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
storybookjs/storybook (storybook)
v10.6.2Compare Source
v10.6.1Compare Source
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