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fix: Update certificate bundles for eMudhra CA key compromise - #204
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chrisburr merged 1 commit intoOct 26, 2026
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The private keys of eight eMudhra/emSign intermediate CA certificates were disclosed as compromised on 2026-10-20 (CVE-2026-111943). - Require certifi >=2026.10.19 and ca-certificates >=2026.10.19, which remove the compromised emSign roots (the unaffected emSign Root CA - G1 is retained). - Require pip >=26.2.2: pip vendors its own certifi bundle and trusts it in addition to the system store, so older pip stays vulnerable. - Exempt these packages (plus pip) from the 7-day release cooldown in pixi.toml, otherwise the security releases would be blocked.
chrisburr
enabled auto-merge (squash)
October 26, 2026 09:55
chrisburr
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Oct 26, 2026
fstagni
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Oct 26, 2026
| # must not be blocked by the 7-day window. | ||
| ca-certificates = "0d" | ||
| certifi = "0d" | ||
| pip = "0d" |
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I'll create a follow-up PR to remove this exception later on
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Summary
On 2026-10-20 the private keys of eight eMudhra/emSign intermediate CA certificates were disclosed as compromised (CVE-2026-111943, keys trivially recoverable,
d < 256). TLS clients still trusting them are exposed to MITM attacks, and DIRACOS ships its own trust stores, so the installer must not build with pre-patch bundles.Note:
pixi.tomlalready had a 7-dayexclude-newercooldown to avoid compromised/broken releases; it would also have blocked these security releases, hence the targeted exemptions (same pattern as the existingconstructorexemption).Evidence
Verified against the live incident checker from a DIRACOS environment with the updated packages (certifi 2026.10.23, pip 26.2.2):
Bundle inspection confirms the compromised roots (
emSign Root TLS CA - G3,emSign Root CS CA - G3,emSign ECC Root CA - G3and the Sectigo AAA cross-sign) are gone from bothca-certificatesandcertifibundles, while the unaffectedemSign Root CA - G1is correctly retained.Merge Danger
Door: two-way (revertable bump; the floors can be relaxed later)
Blast Radius: TLS trust of all DIRACOS installer builds. Removal of the emSign roots could break connections to services that (still) legitimately use emSign-issued certificates, but these roots were removed by every major trust store for the same reason.